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Abstract—We consider an echo-assisted communication model
wherein block-coded messages, when transmitted across several
frames, reach the destination as multiple noisy copies. We
address adversarial attacks on such models wherein a subset of
the noisy copies are vulnerable to manipulation by an adversary.
Particularly, we study a non-persistent attack model with the
adversary attacking 50% of the frames on the vulnerable copies
in an i.i.d. fashion. We show that this adversarial model drives
the destination to detect the attack locally within every frame,
thereby resulting in degraded performance due to false-positives
and miss-detection. Our main objective is to characterize the
mutual information of this adversarial echo-assisted channel
by incorporating the performance of attack-detection strategies.
With the use of an imperfect detector, we show that the com-
pound channel comprising the adversarial echo-assisted channel
and the attack detector exhibits memory-property, and as a
result, obtaining closed-form expressions on mutual information
is intractable. To circumvent this problem, we present a new
framework to approximate the mutual information by deriving
sufficient conditions on the channel parameters and also the
performance of the attack detectors. Finally, we propose two
attack-detectors, which are inspired by traditional as well as
neural-network ideas, and show that the mutual information
offered by these detectors is close to that of the Genie detector
for short frame-lengths.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of wireless applications exists involving echo-
assisted communication wherein messages transmitted by the
source arrive at the destination as multiple noisy copies.
Typical examples include communication over frequency-
selective channels [1], relay networks [2], and multiple receive
antennas [3]. In such scenarios, it is well known that suitably
combining these copies can increase the effective signal-to-
noise-ratio, thereby facilitating higher transmission rate.
In this work, we consider attack models on echo-assisted
communication wherein a subset of the copies collected at
the destination might have been manipulated by an adversary.
Attacks on only a subset of copies are attributed to practical
limitations on the adversary to manipulate all the copies.
For instance, in the case of frequency-selective channels
with delay spreads, the adversary may have processing-delay
constraints to manipulate the first copy, but not the subsequent
ones [1]. We study a specific adversarial attack referred to as
the flipping attack [4] wherein the message bits of the attacked
copy are flipped at 50% rate independently. With such attacks,
the dilemma at the destination is whether to use the vulnerable
copies or discard them when recovering the messages. To gain
insights on the attack model, we focus on the case of two
received copies, out of which the second copy might have been
manipulated by an adversary. Although adversarial models
on binary channels have been studied by the information-
theory community [4], [5], flipping attacks on echo-assisted
communication involving binary input and continuous output
have not been studied hitherto. Henceforth, throughout the
paper, we refer to the source and the destination as Alice and
Bob, respectively.
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Fig. 1. Compound channel comprising the source, adversarial echo-assisted
channel, and the combining strategy, which is aided by the attack-detection
block at the destination. In this work, we characterize the mutual information
I(xn; ync | Aˆ) of the compound channel, where x
n ∈ {−1,+1}n is the
input frame, yn
1
∈ Rn and yn
2
∈ Rn are the two received copies at the
destination, Aˆ is the binary variable which represents the decision of the
attack detector, and ync ∈ R
n is the output of the combining block.
A. Motivation
Consider an echo-assisted communication setting, as shown
in Fig. 1, wherein a binary codeword of large block-length
is transmitted from Alice to Bob as a sequence of several
frames, each of length n. Upon transmission of a frame,
denoted by xn, Bob receives two noisy copies of it, denoted
by yn1 ∈ R
n and yn2 ∈ R
n, in the presence of additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN). It is well known that appropriately
combining these two copies can yield higher signal-to-noise-
ratio at Bob, which in turn assists Alice to transmit at higher-
rate than when only one of the copies is used to decode the
codeword. The adversarial model in our setting is that the
second copy is vulnerable to the flipping attack but not the first
one. Specifically, we consider a non-persistent attack model,
wherein the second copy is vulnerable to the flipping attack
on 50% of the frames chosen at random in an i.i.d. fashion.1
A conservative strategy to handle this adversarial setting is as
follows:
1Persistent adversarial model, wherein all the frames of the second copy
are under attack, is relatively straightforward to handle, as Bob may detect
the attack accurately when the block-length of the code is large.
TABLE I
MUTUAL INFORMATION COMPUTATION OF ATTACK-DETECTORS IN
ECHO-ASSISTED COMMUNICATION
Operating Region of the Detector Mutual Information
Computation
pmd = 0, pfa = 0 (Genie Detector) Tractable
pmd = 0, pfa = 1 (Conservative Strategy) Tractable
0 < pmd < 1, 0 < pfa < 1 Intractable
A special case of the regime We propose
0 < pmd < 1, 0 < pfa < 1 an approximation in Theorem 1
• Bob discards yn2 irrespective of the attack, and only uses
yn1 to recover the message, i.e., y
n
c = y
n
1 as per Fig. 1.
• Alice uses a codebook designed for Gaussian channels
to achieve the rate I(x; y1), wherein y1 = γ1x+ z1 such
that x ∈ {−1,+1}, z1 ∼ N(0, σ
2), and γ1 is a constant
known to both Alice and Bob.
Keeping in view of the above conservative baseline, we are
interested in designing a combining strategy at Bob which
can assist Alice in transmitting at higher-rate than I(x; y1).
Towards achieving higher-rate, it is clear that Bob must
first observe yn2 , detect whether y
n
2 is attacked, and then
decide to combine it with yn1 to recover the message. Since
the frames are under attack in an i.i.d. fashion, Bob has
to detect the attack locally by observing the n samples of
the frame, and this detection problem can be challenging
especially when n is small. Given that a practical detection
strategy is typically imperfect, the combining strategy may
lead to degraded performance either (i) when the flipping
attack on yn2 is misdetected, or (ii) when a legitimate frame
yn2 is categorized as under attack. While the performance
of detectors can be evaluated by miss-detection and false-
positive rates, these traditional metrics do not capture any rate-
loss incurred by the source in aiding the detection strategy.
As a result, there is a need to characterize the achievable
rates of this adversarial echo-assisted channel in terms of the
performance of the underlying attack-detectors.
B. Contributions
The main contributions of this work are listed below:
• On the echo-assisted communication model discussed
in Section I-A, we quantify the performance of attack
detectors by computing the mutual information of the
compound channel, which comprises of the source, the
adversarial echo-channel, and the combining strategy,
which is guided by the attack detector at Bob, as shown
in Fig. 1. This way, we incorporate the traditional met-
rics of miss-detection rates, denoted by pmd, and false-
positive rates, denoted by pfa, indirectly into the mutual
information of the compound channel. Henceforth, the
mutual information of the compound channel, as shown
in Fig. 1, is referred to as the mutual information of the
underlying attack-detector.
• Although the adversarial model has memory, we show
that the compound channel involving a Genie detector
(which corresponds to pmd = 0 and pfa = 0) is mem-
oryless by the virtue of perfect knowledge of the attack
event at Bob. As a result, we show that computation of
mutual information of Genie detectors is tractable (as
listed in Table I). However, it is well known that Genie
detectors cannot be realized in practice especially when
the frame-length is not sufficiently large. We show that
the compound channel comprising a practical (imperfect)
attack detector, such that 0 < pmd < 1, 0 < pfa < 1,
continues to have memory, and this in addition to finitary
constraint on the input alphabet [6], renders mutual
information computation intractable. To circumvent this
issue, we provide a new framework to approximate the
mutual information of imperfect detectors. Specifically,
we provide sufficient conditions on (i) the miss-detection
and false-positive rates of detectors (as shown in Fig. 2),
and (ii) on the channel parameters such that the proposed
approximation holds (see Theorem 1).
• In the last part of this work (see Section IV), we propose
two attack detectors, namely: (i) k Nearest Neighbor
(KNN) estimator, which measures the mutual information
between yn1 and y
n
2 to detect the flipping attack, and (ii)
a Neural Network (NN) classifier, which uses two hidden
layers to solve the detection problem as a supervised
classification problem. We present our approximations
on the mutual information of these detectors and show
that the NN classifier is capable of accurately detecting
the attacks on frames-lengths as short as 100 and 40
symbols at low signal-to-noise-ratio of 0 dB and 5 dB,
respectively.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1 pfa|x
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p
m
d
|x
Slope = 
1
Fig. 2. Plot of {(pmd|x¯, 1 − pfa|x¯)} of two detectors, where pmd|x¯ and
pfa|x¯ denote the miss-detection and false-positive rates conditioned on input
codewords xn = x¯ for n = 3. We propose a framework to approximate
the achievable rates of detectors which have {(pmd|x¯, 1 − pfa|x¯) | x¯ ∈
{−1, 1}n} below the line with slope µ
1−µ
for some small 0 < µ < 1. To
exemplify, given a small µ > 0, our framework can approximate the rate of
the detector marked with symbol × in green but not the one with ◦ in red.
Notations: For an n-dimensional random vector yn ∈
R
n with joint probability distribution function P (yn), its
differential entropy, denoted by h(yn), is represented as
−E[log2(P (y
n))], where the expectation is over P (yn). A
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance σ2 is
denoted by N(0, σ2). An n × n identity matrix, an n-length
vector of zeros, and an n-length vector of ones are denoted
by In, 0n, and 1n, respectively. For a given n-length vector,
denoted by yn, the notation yn
′
for n′ ≤ n, denotes the n′-
length vector containing the first n′ components of yn. The
notation prob(·) denotes the usual probability operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Alice transmits an n-length frame xn ∈ {−1,+1}n such
that the components of xn are i.i.d. over the Probability
Mass Function (PMF) {α, 1 − α} for some 0 < α < 1.
Meanwhile, Bob receives two copies of xn over the Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channels as
yn1 = γ1x
n+zn1 ∈ R
n and yn2 = γ2(b
n ◦xn)+zn2 ∈ R
n, (1)
where γ1 ∈ R and γ2 ∈ R are non-zero constants known
to both Alice and Bob, zn1 and z
n
2 represent the additive
white Gaussian noise vectors distributed as N(0n, σ
2
In). We
assume that zn1 and z
n
2 are statistically independent. Between
the two copies, we assume that yn2 is vulnerable to the flipping
attack, whereas yn1 is not. To model the flipping attack on
yn2 , we introduce Hadamard product, denoted by ◦, between
bn ∈ {−1,+1}n and xn. When the frame is under attack, the
components of bn are i.i.d. over the PMF {0.5, 0.5}, and are
unknown to both Alice and Bob. However, without attack,
bn = 1n. In this adversarial setting, the attacker executes
the flipping attack on a frame chosen randomly in an i.i.d.
fashion with probability 0.5. By using A = 0 and A = 1
to denote the events of attack and no-attack, respectively, we
have prob(A = 0) = prob(A = 1) = 0.5.
With no knowledge of A at Bob, characterizing the mutual
information (MI) of the adversarial channel is intractable due
to the memory-property introduced by the attacker. However,
when A is perfectly known at Bob, we can compute the
MI of the compound channel shown in Fig. 1, wherein
the underlying detector is the Genie detector, which assigns
Aˆ = A for each frame.
Proposition 1: The MI of the compound channel involving
the Genie detector is
M
Genie = I(x; yc,na)
n
2
+ I(x; y1)
n
2
, (2)
where yc,na = (|γ1|
2+ |γ2|
2)x+zc and y1 = γ1x+z1 are the
scalar channels such that x ∈ {−1,+1} with PMF {α, 1−α},
and the additive noise zc = γ1z1 + γ2z2 is distributed as
N(0, σ2eq) with σ
2
eq = (|γ1|
2 + |γ2|
2)σ2.
Proof: The average MI offered by the compound channel
comprising the Genie detector is
M
Genie = I(xn; yn1 , y
n
2 | A = 0)prob(A = 0)
+ I(xn; yn1 , y
n
2 | A = 1)prob(A = 1),
=
1
2
I(xn; yn1 , y
n
2 | A = 0)
+
1
2
I(xn; yn1 , y
n
2 | A = 1). (3)
When A = 1, each bit of xn on the second copy is flipped by
the attacker with probability 0.5 in an i.i.d. fashion, and as a
result, it is straightforward to prove that I(xn; yn2 | A = 1) =
0. As a consequence, we have
I(xn; yn1 , y
n
2 | A = 1) = I(x
n; yn1 ) = nI(x; y1), (4)
where the last equality is applicable due to the memoryless
property of the channel on the first copy. This implies that
discarding yn2 is the optimal strategy at Bob when A = 1. On
the other hand, when A = 0, the mutual information of the
compound channel is given by
I(xn; yn1 , y
n
2 | A = 0) = I(x
n; yn1 , y
n
2 | b
n = 1n),
= I(xn; ync,na),
= nI(x; yc,na), (5)
where ync,na in the second equality is obtained by combining
yn1 and y
n
2 as y
n
c,na = γ1y
n
1 + γ2y
n
2 = (|γ1|
2+ |γ2|
2)xn + znc ,
such that the additive noise vector znc = γ1z
n
1 + γ2z
n
2
is distributed as N(0n, σ
2
eqIn), where σ
2
eq = (|γ1|
2 +
|γ2|
2)σ2. It is straightforward to verify that I(xn, ync,na) =
I(xn; yn1 , y
n
2 | b
n = 1n), which implies that the combining
strategy is optimal without the attack. Note that the last
equality is applicable by using the memoryless nature of the
channel, attributed to the perfect knowledge of A at Bob.
Finally, by using (4) and (5) in (3), we get the expression
for mutual information in (2). This completes the proof.
Since x takes values from a finite input alphabet, MGenie
in (2) can be numerically computed as a function of the input
PMF {α, 1−α}, constants γ1 and γ2, and σ
2 [6]. Specifically,
I(x; yc,na) is given by
I(x; yc,na) = h(yc,na)− h(yc,na|x), (7)
where h(yc,na) = −E[log2(P (yc,na))] such that P (yc,na) is
as given in (6). The conditional entropy h(yc,na|x) can be
computed using the distribution P (yc,na|x = β) given by
P (yc,na|x = β) =
1√
2piσ2eq
e
−
(yc,na−β(|γ1|
2+|γ2|
2))2
2σ2eq ,
for β ∈ {−1,+1}. Similarly, we can also compute I(x; y1).
Although the mutual information of Genie detectors can
be computed based on Proposition 1, it is well known that
practical detectors not perfect. Therefore, in the next section,
we address the challenges involved in computing the MI of
(imperfect) practical attack-detectors.
III. MUTUAL INFORMATION WITH PRACTICAL
DETECTION STRATEGY
We consider a practical attack-detection strategy, as shown
in Fig. 3, which uses the received samples {yn1 , y
n
2 } to detect
the flipping attack on every frame. Based on the detector’s
output, represented by the variable Aˆ ∈ {0, 1}, Bob decides
either to combine yn1 and y
n
2 , or discard y
n
2 . Note that this
detector is typically imperfect, and as a result, it has its
associated miss-detection and false-positive rates, defined as
pmd , prob(Aˆ = 0 | A = 1) and pfa , prob(Aˆ = 1 | A = 0),
respectively. When the detector outputs Aˆ = 1, Bob drops
the samples yn2 , and only uses the samples y
n
1 to recover the
message. On the other hand, when the detector outputs Aˆ = 0,
Bob combines yn1 and y
n
2 to obtain y
n
c = γ1y
n
1 + γ2y
n
2 and
then uses it to recover the message.
P (yc,na) =
1√
2piσ2eq
(
αe
−
(yc,na−(|γ1|
2+|γ2|
2))2
2σ2eq + (1− α)e
−
(yc,na+(|γ1|
2+|γ2|
2))2
2σ2eq
)
(6)
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Fig. 3. Depiction of the combining strategy with a practical detection
algorithm.
In the event of miss-detection, i.e., when A = 1 and Aˆ = 0,
we know that bn ∈ {−1,+1}n is random and unknown to
Bob. Therefore, ync is denoted as y
n
c,a, and is given by
ync,a = (|γ1|
2 + bn|γ2|
2) ◦ xn + znc . (8)
However, when A = 0 and Aˆ = 0, we have bn = 1n, and
therefore, ync is denoted as y
n
c,na, and is given by
ync,na = (|γ1|
2 + |γ2|
2)xn + znc . (9)
The MI of this detection strategy, denoted by Mnon−Geniepmd,pfa , is
M
non−Genie
pmd,pfa
= I(xn; ync | Aˆ = 0)prob(Aˆ = 0)
+ I(xn; yn1 )prob(Aˆ = 1), (10)
where prob(Aˆ = 0) = 12 (1 + pmd − pfa) and prob(Aˆ = 1) =
1
2 (1− pmd + pfa).
To compute Mnon−Geniepmd,pfa , we have to compute
I(xn; ync | Aˆ = 0) for a given frame-length n. However, this
needs us to evaluate the differential entropy of the probability
distribution function P (ync | Aˆ = 0) given in (12). Since the
input alphabet is finite in size, the corresponding differential
entropy can only be computed using numerical methods,
and as a result, computing Mnon−Geniepmd,pfa is intractable for
sufficiently large n (of the order of hundreds). In a nutshell,
the above computational issue is because the equivalent
channel when Aˆ = 0 is not memoryless. To circumvent this
problem, we show that the MI value Mnon−Geniepmd,pfa of some
detectors can be computed using an approximation under
special conditions on pmd and pfa.
The following sequence of definitions and lemmas are
useful to present our results on approximation in Theorem
1.
Definition 1: For 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1, let a set Rµ, for some
negligible µ > 0, be defined as
Rµ ,
{
(x, y) | y ≤
µ
1− µ
x
}
.
Definition 2: For a given attack-detector, we define its
performance profile as
P ,
{
(pmd|x¯, 1− pfa|x¯) | ∀ x¯ ∈ {−1, 1}
n
}
,
where pmd|x¯ = prob(Aˆ = 0|A = 1, x
n = x¯) and pfa|x¯ =
prob(Aˆ = 1|A = 0, xn = x¯).
Definition 3: For a given x¯ ∈ {−1, 1}n, let Sx¯ = {(|γ1|
2+
b¯|γ2|
2)◦x¯ | ∀ b¯ = {−1, 1}n} denote an n-dimensional discrete
constellation in Rn obtained by using b¯ over {−1,+1}n. On
Sx¯, we define,
• d2min(y
n, Sx¯) = min
sn∈Sx¯
||yn − sn||2F
• d2max(y
n, Sx¯) = max
sn∈Sx¯
||yn − sn||2F
• d2max(Sx¯) = max
sn1 ,s
n
2∈Sx¯
||sn1 − s
n
2 ||
2
F ,
where yn ∈ Rn and || · ||2F denotes the squared Euclidean
distance.
Lemma 1: If a, b, µ are such that 0 ≤ a ≤ 2b and µ > 0 is
a negligible number, then we have µa+ (1− µ)b ≈ b.
Proof: The convex combination µa + (1 − µ)b can be
written as b−µ(b−a). This implies that µa+(1−µ)b = b−λ,
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ µb when a ≤ b, and −µb ≤ λ < 0 when
b < a ≤ 2b. Since µ is negligible, b− λ ≈ b for every b ≥ 0.
Since the accuracy of the approximation depends on µ, we
henceforth denote ≈ by ≈µ.
Lemma 2: If γ1, γ2 and σ
2
eq are such that d
2
max(Sx¯) ≤
2loge(2)σ
2
eq for each x¯ ∈ {−1,+1}
n, then we have
P (ync,a = y
n|x¯) ≤ 2P (ync,na = y
n|x¯), (13)
P (ync,a = y
n) ≤ 2P (ync,na = y
n), (14)
for every yn ∈ Rn.
Proof: We only show the applicability of (13). Since
P (ync,a = y
n) can be written as a weighted sum of
P (ync,a = y
n|x¯) over all x¯, (13) can be used to
show the applicability of (14). Given xn = x¯, the n-
dimensional distribution of ync,a is given by P (y
n
c,a|x¯) =
1
(2piσ2eq)
n
2
1
2n
∑
bn=b¯ e
−
||ync,a−(|γ1|
2+b¯|γ2|
2)◦x¯||2
F
2σ2eq . When evalu-
ated at yn ∈ Rn, we can upper bound the above term as
P (ync,a = y
n|x¯) ≤
1
(2piσ2eq)
n
2
e
−
d2min(y
n,Sx¯)
2σ2eq , (15)
where d2min(y
n, Sx¯) is as given in Definition 3. Meanwhile,
the n-dimensional distribution of ync,na is given by
P (ync,na = y
n|x¯) =
1
(2piσ2eq)
n
2
e
−
||yn−(|γ1|
2+|γ2|
2)x¯||2
F
2σ2eq ,
≥
1
(2piσ2eq)
n
2
e
−
d2max(y
n,Sx¯)
2σ2eq ,
≥
1
(2piσ2eq)
n
2
e
−
d2min(y
n,Sx¯)+d
2
max(Sx¯)
2σ2eq (16)
where the first inequality holds since (|γ1|
2 + |γ2|
2)x¯ ∈ Sx¯.
The second inequality holds because of triangle inequality.
P (ync | Aˆ = 0) =
P (ync |A = 1, Aˆ = 0)prob(A = 1, Aˆ = 0) + P (y
n
c |A = 0, Aˆ = 0)prob(A = 0, Aˆ = 0)
prob(Aˆ = 0)
=
P (ync,a)pmd + P (y
n
c,na)(1− pfa)
pmd + 1− pfa
(11)
P (ync | Aˆ = 0) =
pmd
(2piσ2eq)
n
2 (pmd + 1− pfa)
1
2n
∑
xn=x¯
prob(xn = x¯)
(∑
bn=b¯
e
−
||ync −(|γ1|
2+b¯|γ2|
2)◦x¯||2F
2σ2eq
)
(12)
+
1− pfa
(2piσ2eq)
n
2 (pmd + 1− ppfa)
∑
xn=x¯
prob(xn = x¯)e
−
||ync −(|γ1|
2+|γ2|
2)x¯||2
F
2σ2eq
Finally, if d2max(Sx¯) ≤ 2loge(2)σ
2
eq for each x¯ ∈ {−1,+1}
n,
then (16) can be further lower bounded as
P (ync,na = y
n|x¯) ≥
1
(2piσ2eq)
n
2
e
−
d2min(y
n,Sx¯)+2loge(2)σ
2
eq
2σ2eq ,
=
1
2(2piσ2eq)
n
2
e
−
d2min(y
n,Sx¯)
2σ2eq , (17)
≥
1
2
P (ync,a = y
n|x¯), (18)
where the last inequality is due to the bound in (15). This
implies that P (ync,a = y
n|x¯) ≤ 2P (ync,na = y
n|x¯) for each
yn. This completes the proof.
Using the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we are now
ready to present our result on approximation.
Theorem 1: If γ1, γ2 and σ
2
eq are such that d
2
max(Sx¯) ≤
2loge(2)σ
2
eq for each x¯ ∈ {−1,+1}
n, and if the detection
strategy is such that P ⊆ Rµ, for a fixed small µ > 0, then
we have Mnon−Geniepmd,pfa ≈µ,pdf M
approx
pfa
, where
M
approx
pfa
=
n
2
I(x; yc,na)(1−pfa)+
n
2
I(x; y1)(1+pfa), (19)
and the notation ≈µ,pdf captures the notion that the approx-
imation on MI is a result of approximating the underlying
distributions using ≈µ.
Proof: Based on the expression of Mnon−Geniepmd,pfa in (10), it
is straightforward to show that I(xn; yn1 ) = nI(x; y1). In this
proof, we only address the computation of I(xn; ync | Aˆ = 0).
From first principles, we have
I(xn; ync | Aˆ = 0) = h(y
n
c | Aˆ = 0)− h(y
n
c | x
n, Aˆ = 0),
where h(ync | Aˆ = 0) can be obtained using P (y
n
c | Aˆ = 0)
as
h(ync | Aˆ = 0) = −E
[
log2
(
P (ync | Aˆ = 0)
)]
,
where P (ync | Aˆ = 0) is as given in (11). When the attack-
detection technique operates at P ⊆ Rµ, then we can show that
(pmd, pfa) ∈ Rµ, where pfa = E[pfa|x¯] and pmd = E[pmd|x¯]
such that the expectation is over xn. By applying the results
of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 on (11), we get
P (ync | Aˆ = 0) ≈µ P (y
n
c,na).
The above approximation holds because pmd
pmd+1−pfa
plays
the role of µ in Lemma 1, and the condition a ≤ 2b of
Lemma 1 is satisfied because of (14) in Lemma 2. As a result
h(ync | Aˆ = 0) ≈µ,pdf −E[log2(P (y
n
c,na))]. Furthermore,
since each component of ync,na is independent across n, we
have
h(ync | Aˆ = 0) ≈µ,pdf h(y
n
c,na) = nh(yc,na), (20)
where h(yc,na) = −E[log2(P (yc,na))] such that P (yc,na) is
given by (6). Similarly, the conditional differential entropy
h(ync | Aˆ = 0, x
n) is given by
h(ync | Aˆ = 0, x
n) =
∑
xn=x¯
p(x¯|Aˆ = 0)h(ync | Aˆ = 0, x
n = x¯),
(21)
where p(x¯|Aˆ = 0) , prob(xn = x¯|Aˆ = 0) and h(ync | Aˆ =
0, xn = x¯) = −E[log2(P (y
n
c | Aˆ = 0, x
n = x¯))] such that
P (ync | Aˆ = 0, x
n = x¯) can be written as
P (ync,a | x
n = x¯)pmd|x¯ + P (y
n
c,na | x
n = x¯)(1 − pfa|x¯)
pmd|x¯ + 1− pfa|x¯
. (22)
To arrive at (22), we assume that A and xn are statistically
independent. Again, applying the results of Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 on (22), we have the approximation
P (ync | Aˆ = 0, x
n = x¯) ≈µ P (y
n
c,na | x
n = x¯),
for every xn = x¯. As a result, we have h(ync | Aˆ = 0, x
n =
x¯) ≈µ,pdf h(y
n
c,na | x
n = x¯). Finally, using the above
expression in (21), we get
h(ync | Aˆ = 0, x
n) ≈µ,pdf
∑
xn=x¯
p(x¯|Aˆ = 0)h(ync,na | x
n = x¯)
= h(znc ) = nh(yc,na | x), (23)
where the last equality is due to i.i.d. nature of znc . Overall,
using (23) and (20) in (10), we get the expression in (19).
The proposed sufficient condition on the performance pro-
file of attack detectors is also depicted in Fig. 2. Due to
intractability in evaluating Mnon−Geniepmd,pfa , Theorem 1 approx-
imates the MI of a special class of detectors when (i) the
detectors operate in the region P ⊆ Rµ, and (ii) the channel
parameters γ1, γ2, σ
2 satisfy Lemma 2. For such a class of
detectors, the MI Mapproxpfa , given in (19) is now easy to
evaluate since I(x; yc,na) and I(x; y1) can be computed using
standard numerical methods [6]. Note that the Genie detector
trivially belongs to this special class, and as a result, (19)
is upper bounded by MGenie in (2). Also note that (19) is
lower bounded by nI(x; y1), which is the MI offered by the
conservative strategy of unconditionally dropping yn2 when
recovering the message.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
To conduct experiments on the performance of attack de-
tection in echo-assisted communication, we use the system
model in Section II with α = 0.5, γ1 = γ2 = 1, and
SNR = 10log10(
1
σ2
) ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15} in dB. We propose
the following two detectors which are designed to detect the
flipping attack by using the first n′ samples of the received
frames, namely {yn
′
1 , y
n′
2 }, for some n
′ ≤ n.
1) k Nearest-Neighbor (KNN) MI Estimation: Based on the
attack model in Section II, we observe that I(y1; y2 | A =
0) > I(y1; y2 | A = 1), and both these terms can be calculated
off-line. As a result, we use a detection strategy that measures
the MI between yn
′
1 and y
n′
2 by using scikit-learn [7] library’s
MI calculation method using k nearest neighbors [8]. The
proposed detection strategy feeds an appropriate value of Aˆ
to the combining block depending on whether the MI estimate
is above or below the threshold, which in turn is empirically
chosen such that pmd is bounded by 0.1%.
2) Neural Network (NN) Classifier: In this method, we pose
attack detection as a supervised classification problem. The
proposed NN uses two hidden layers with ReLU activation
function followed by a sigmoid output at the end. The inputs
to the training phase constitutes channel outputs, namely,
{yn
′
1 , y
n′
2 } (with 50% of the frames under attack) along with
the respective ground truths on A. Based on the inputs, the
NN estimates the probability of attack by minimizing an
appropriate binary cross-entropy function. We train for eight
epochs to ensure convergence over the training set with a batch
size of 512 using the Adam optimizer [9]. To achieve the
constraint of pmd = 0.1%, we empirically find an appropriate
threshold which gives 0.1% miss-detection rate on the training
data set, and then measure pmd and pfa on the validation data
set.
For each combination of n′ ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 100} and
SNR ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15}, we repeat the experiments to compute
pfa of the above detectors by driving their pmd = 0.1%.
Subsequently, we substitute the corresponding pfa in (19) to
obtain Mapproxpfa , as presented in Fig. 4. The plots show that
the NN classifier outperforms the KNN detection significantly
at SNR = 0 dB, whereas the benefits of the NN classifier are
not significant at SNR = 5 dB. Furthermore, we highlight
that Mapproxpfa offered by the NN detector is close to that of
the Genie detector for frame-lengths as short as 100 and 40
symbols at 0 dB and 5 dB, respectively. For more details on
our experiments, we refer the reader to [10], where the source
codes of the detectors are also available.
A. Discussion on Relevance of Theorem 1
For each n′ and SNR, we can evaluate the tightness of the
MI values in Fig. 4 by first computing P, and then determining
an appropriate µ′ such that P ⊆ Rµ′ . With that, (19) qualifies
as an approximation with accuracy µ′. Although obtaining
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pfa of attack detectors based on KNN and NN classifier for
various n′ ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 100} and SNR = {0, 5, 10, 15} in dB. We omit
the results for SNR = 10, 15 since both detectors achieve the Genie bound.
the performance profile P through exhaustive experiments is
computationally challenging for large n, sampling techniques
can be used to estimate µ′. For instance, at n′ = 50 and
SNR = 0 dB, we have used the NN classifier to empirically
compute the pairs {(pmd|x¯, 1 − pfa|x¯)} for 10000 randomly
chosen codewords, and have verified that more than 99% of
them lie inside Rµ′ with µ
′ = 3× 10−3.
As the second caveat, we recollect that Theorem 1 is
applicable if γ1, γ2 and σ
2 satisfy the conditions in Lemma 2.
However, for arbitrary values of γ1, γ2 and σ
2, we do not have
a proof on the applicability of the upper bound in (13) for all
yn ∈ Rn, nor we can verify (13) for a given yn ∈ Rn due to
intractable distributions. By acknowledging these limitations
we caution the reader not to interpret the plots in Fig. 4 as
exact MI values. Nevertheless, we have presented Mapproxpfa
as they serve as benchmarks for comparison with tighter
approximations on Mnon−Geniepmd,pfa in future.
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